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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND TEACHER
REINSTATEMENT: THE REMEDY
Almost overnight the Glorious Loyalty Oath Crusade
was in full flower. . . . Every time they turned around
there was another loyalty oath to be signed.
[P]eople who were loyal would not mind signing all
the loyalty oaths they had to. . . . The more loyalty oaths
a person signed, the more loyal he was ...
"The important thing is to keep them pledging ...
It doesn't matter whether they mean it or not."
-Joseph Heller, Catch-22
Loyalty oaths have been a prolific source of litigation, especially
in the wake of the McCarthy hysteria of the early 1950's. Early cases
upheld oaths for public employees which proscribed knowing mem-
bership in organizations advocating the violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment.' When the oath excluded all members of an alleged sub-
versive group from public jobs, due process prohibited the arbitrary
inclusion of the innocent with the knowing members.2 Later cases
limited loyalty oath disqualification to knowing members who specif-
ically intended to further the organization's unlawful aims. 3 Since the
substantive issues of loyalty oaths have been thoroughly discussed by
others,4 they will not be considered here in detail.
Although the constitutional limitations on the content of loyalty
oaths have been settled, there remain problems in fashioning a proper
remedy for a free speech claim. Monroe v. Trustees of the California
1. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S 716 (1951). Cf. Adler v. Board
of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S.
56 (1951) (per curiam).
2. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
3. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); see, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389
U.S. 54 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958); cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
4. E.g., Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SUPREME Cr.
REv. 193; Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28 L. & CoNMMP.
PROB. 487 (1963); 50 MIcH. L. Rav. 467 (1952); 32 NoTan DAME LAw. 524 (1957);
25 TEMP. L.Q. 207 (1951). See also Asper, The Long and Unhappy History of Loy-
alty Testing in Maryland, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 97 (1969).
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State Colleges,5 a 1971 California Supreme Court decision, posed some
interesting practical questions involving the statute of limitations and
the scope of the remedy in a situation where the legality of the loyalty
oath in question previously had been resolved.' The statute of limi-
tations section of the opinion closely followed precedent, and this note
therefore will summarize that issue without extended discussion. The
court also considered the mechanics of reinstatement in greater detail
than prior cases7 and concluded that title 5, section 43550 of the Cali-
fornia Administrative Code should control the discharged teacher's re-
instatement.' This note will test the adequacy of Monroe's remedy
against the principles enunciated in other free speech cases. The note
will conclude that unless section 43550 is strictly construed, the remedy
is inadequate in a free speech context. An alternative remedy will be
suggested.
The Factual Background of Monroe
In 1950, Albert Monroe was discharged from his tenured aca-
demic position as full professor and chairman of the Language Arts
Division at San Francisco State College for refusing to sign the anti-
5. 6 Cal. 3d 399, 491 P.2d 1105, 99 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1971).
6. Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr.
409 (1967) (loyalty oath held unconstitutional).
7. The decisions holding dismissals unwarranted usually state that the dismissal
was improper and reverse, often with direction for further proceedings consistent with
the opinion. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Lerner v. Board of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 382, 380 P.2d 97,
29 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1963). Fountain v. State Bd. of Educ., 157 Cal. App. 2d 463,
320 P.2d 899 (1958), contained the most detailed reinstatement order of any case cited
in Monroe. There, an appellate court affirmed the trial court order "that he is entitled
to be restored to his employment . . . and to all rights under his contract of employ-
ment, including tenure, promotion, salary increases and contract renewals ...... Id. at
467, 320 P.2d at 902.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with specific remedy problems in the
more recent school desegregation cases. In United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (faculty and staff desegregation), the Court approved a
lower court order setting a specific minimum ratio of minority to majority staff mem-
bers. Id. at 232-35. In Sivann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971), the Court discussed remedies at length and affirmed the lower court's detailed
integration plan. Id. at 22-32.
8. 6 Cal. 3d at 410-11, 491 P.2d at 1112-13, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37. Section
43550 was adopted by the trustees pursuant to California Education Code sections 22604,
22607 and 24201. Id. California Administrative Code title 5, section 43550 provides:
"Employees Leaving With Reinstatement Rights. The appointing power shall re-
instate any employee, who meets all employment requirements, and who left his classifi-
cation with reinstatement rights as prescribed by law or by these rules, to a position in
the classification which he left or the equivalent thereof. Such employees shall not
lose any benefits or credit for prior service enjoyed at the time of separation."
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subversive Levering Oath' then required of all state employees. Dur-
ing the time he pursued his administrative remedies, the constitution-
ality of the oath was upheld in Pockman v. Leonard.'0 Consequently,
Monroe sought no judicial redress for his dismissal.
Because of intervening United States Supreme Court decisions, the
California Supreme Court in 1967 declared the Levering Oath uncon-
stitutional in Vogel v. County of Los Angeles." Immediately after
this decision, Monroe requested reinstatement, but his request was re-
fused without a hearing by the Trustees of the California State Colleges.
He then turned to the courts seeking a writ of mandate compelling
the trustees to reinstate him to his former position, to restore pension
rights upon payment of his contribution, and to reimburse him for $79,-
000 in lost salary. He further alleged that there was a need for teach-
ers with his qualifications and that no dismissals or demotions would
result from his reinstatement.' 2 The trial court sustained a general de-
murrer on statute of limitations grounds, the appellate court affirmed 3
and the California Supreme Court granted a hearing.
Statute of Limitations
The trustees contended that the statute of limitations prohibited
Monroe from challenging their action. The supreme court answered
this defense by referring to its previous decision in Lerner v. Los Angeles
City Board of Education'4 and concluded that the statute of limita-
tions had in fact run on any action for wrongful discharge. However,
the court found that a cause of action for reinstatement was timely.'5
In Lerner, a tenured instructor's teaching credential was revoked
by the State Board of Education. The revocation was pursuant to a
statute enacted six years after the sex offense Lerner committed. Since
the revocation of his credential rendered him no longer qualified to
teach, Lerner was dismissed by the local board. He did not resort to the
courts at that time.'" However, a later decision, Fountain v. State
Board of Education,'7 held on similar facts that automatic credential
revocation on the basis of an offense committed prior to the enactment of
9. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 3, formerly Cal. Stat. 1950, 3rd Ex. Sess., ch. 7, § 1
at 15.
10. 39 Cal. 2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952), appeal dismissed, 345 U.S. 962 (1953).
11. 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1967).
12. 6 Cal. 3d at 402-04, 491 P.2d at 1106-08, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 130-32.
13. Monroe v. Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges, 95 Cal. Rptr. 704, rev'd, 6
Cal. 3d 399, 491 P.2d 1105, 99 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1971).
14. 59 Cal. 2d 382, 380 P.2d 97, 29 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1963).
15. 6 Cal. 3d at 409, 491 P.2d at 1112, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
16. 59 Cal. 2d at 387, 380 P.2d at 99, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
17. 157 Cal. App. 2d 463, 320 P.2d 899 (1958).
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the statute was improper."' Subsequent to this decision the State Board
of Education voluntarily restored Lerner's credential, but the local
board summarily refused to reinstate him to his former teaching posi-
tion. Lerner then sued for reinstatement, and the California Supreme
Court held that the three-year statute of limitations was no bar to the
cause of action which accrued from the date of the local board's refusal
to reinstate.' 9
The court held that Monroe's petition involved both the initial
discharge and the later "wrongful refusal to reinstate. 2 °  Applying
the Lerner rule to Monroe's situation, the court concluded that the
new action for wrongful refusal to reinstate had accrued in 1968 and
therefore was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations.2 1  The
Monroe court reasoned that the decision holding the loyalty oath un-
constitutional removed the sole basis for Monroe's termination and
continued separation. Thus he was qualified for re-employment in the
same sense that Lerner had been again qualified and entitled to a
hearing on present fitness once his credential was restored.22
Monroe's Remedy
The California Supreme Court clearly recognized the fact that
Monroe's refusal to sign the loyalty oath was the expression of a First
Amendment right. The court characterized the Levering Oath as "in-
valid because it bars persons from public employment for a type of
association that may not be proscribed consistently with First Amend-
ment rights."2 While these rights never have been recognized as ab-
solute, the courts have accorded them a preferred status.2 ' These rights
have been deemed binding on the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment due process guarantee, 25 and the United States Supreme
Court has closely guarded against their infringement by disregarding
18. Id. at 473, 320 P.2d at 905-06.
19. 59 Cal. 2d at 396, 380 P.2d at 105, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
20. 6 Cal. 3d at 408, 491 P.2d at 1111, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
21. Id. at 409, 491 P.2d at 1112, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 411, 491 P.2d at 1113, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 137, quoting Vogel v. County
of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 22, 434 P.2d 961, 964, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409, 412 (1967).
24. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182 (1959).
25. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937); see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incor-
poration assumed without deciding). It is also clear, although the issue has not re-
ceived much attention in comparison with Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment pro-
tections, that federal standards apply. "It is important to note that while it is the
Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the State it is the more specific lim-
iting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this case." Board of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (free exercise of religion clause); accord,
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (establishment of religion clause).
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the presumption of constitutionality usually accorded state legislation
and substituting a "compelling state interest" test.26  The California
courts have also applied the "strict scrutiny" test when fundamental
rights conflict with state objectives.27
Since statutes which impinge upon the right of free speech are
subject to strict scrutiny, it follows that the remedy prescribed judicially
for a claimant who relies on the valid exercise of a First Amendment
right should be subject to an equally stringent test. The remedy of
the free speech claimant must be fashioned carefully to guard against
further infringement of the freedom of expression. Any condition im-
posed upon the remedy must be tested to determine whether the con-
dition is required by a compelling governmental interest. In the fol-
lowing sections, the remedy prescribed by the Monroe court will be
measured against the standards enunciated in Vogel v. County of Los
Angeles.28  The Vogel opinion is chosen as a yardstick not only be-
cause it is a careful statement of the constitutional formulae to be ap-
plied, but also because the opinion tested the same oath that Monroe
refused to sign. 29  Therefore, the Vogel opinion provides a particularly
appropriate guideline for determining whether, in fashioning Monroe's
remedy, the California Supreme Court has met its own standards.
Vogel v. County of Los Angeles
While some regulations of First Amendment rights have withstood
the compelling governmental interest test,30 Vogel makes it clear that
the Levering Oath did not meet these strict standards.3' The Vogel
court summarized the applicable California law as follows. First, pub-
lic employment or other publicly conferred benefits cannot be condi-
tioned upon an arbitrary deprivation of constitutional rights. Second, if
conditions are annexed to a publicly conferred benefit, "the utility of
26. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (freedom of speech);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of religion); N.A.A.C.P. v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association).
27. E.g., Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602
(1971) (five-year residency requirement for holding local elective office voided); Hunt-
ley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 69 Cal. 2d 67, 442 P.2d 685, 69 CaL Rptr. 605 (1968)
(identification requirement for recorded phone messages voided).
28. 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1967).
29. 6 Cal. 3d at 411, 491 P.2d at 1113, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
30. E.g., Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446, 393 P.2d 428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1964) (source disclosure requirement on publications personally attacking political
candidates); Gage v. Allison, 22 Cal. App. 3d 85, 99 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1971) (one-year
residency requirement for holding local elective office); Eisen v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 269 Cal. App. 2d 696, 75 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1969) (disclosure of membership in
registered campus organization). For a general review of permissible restrictions
on speech see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-21 (1971).
31. 68 Cal. 2d at 22, 434 P.2d at 964, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
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imposing the conditions must manifestly outweigh the impairment of
constitutional rights. -3 2 Finally, the court stated:
Even where a compelling state purpose is present, restrictions
on the cherished freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment must be drawn with narrow specificity. First Amend-
ment freedoms are delicate and vulnerable and must be protected
wherever possible. When government seeks to limit those freedoms
on the basis of legitimate and substantial governmental purposes,
such as eliminating subversives from the public service, those
purposes cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. Precision of regulation is required so that the exercise
of our most precious freedoms will not be unduly curtailed except
to the extent necessitated by the legitimate governmental objec-
tive.33
The Remedy Prescribed
When the Monroe court's treatment of the petitioner's reinstate-
ment remedy is measured against the strong and unequivocal language
of Vogel, certain problems emerge. In considering Monroe's remedy
the court again looked to Lerner. Both tenured teachers were termi-
nated under statutes which were later invalidated, both were denied
reinstatement after the only bar to their employment was removed, and
in both cases the employer did not comply with statutory requirements
of notice and hearing.34 The Lerner decision, however, did not dis-
cuss the petitioner's remedy in detail but simply held that he could not
be barred without a hearing."
The Monroe court observed that California Administrative Code
section 43550 provided a proper remedy in this situation.36 That sec-
tion had been adopted by the trustees pursuant to several Education
Code sections37 to provide administrative guidelines for one of the
many functions enumerated in section 24201 .38 Thus, the Adminis-
trative Code parallels Education Code section 24201. 39  Detailed re-
32. Id. at 21, 434 P.2d at 963, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
33. Id. at 22, 434 P.2d at 963, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
34. 6 Cal. 3d at 410, 491 P.2d at 1112, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
35. 59 Cal. 2d at 385, 380 P.2d at 98, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
36. 6 Cal. 3d at 410, 491 P.2d at 1112, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See note 8 supra.
37. 6 Cal. 3d at 410, 491 P.2d at 1112, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 22604, 22607, 24201 (West 1969).
38. See id. § 24201 which provides that "[t]he Trustees shall provide by rule
for the government of their appointees and employees, pursuant to the provisions of
this chapter and other applicable provisions of law, including, but not limited to, ap-
pointment, classification, terms, duties, pay, leave of absence, tenure, vacation, layoff,
dismissal, demotion, suspension and reinstatement." Cf. Stanton v. Dumke, 64 Cal. 2d
199, 203, 411 P.2d 108, 111, 49 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383 (1966).
39. Compare CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 5, §§ 42700-43800 with CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 24201 (West 1969).
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instatement sections40 are provided under general articles regulating
paid leave of absence41 and changed status of disabled employees. 42
Section 43550 comes within the general article for reinstatement,43
presumably covering all situations not otherwise governed by a spe-
cific reinstatement section.
44
In the light of the Vogel admonition that precision of regulation
is required so that the exercise of First Amendment freedoms will not
be unduly curtailed, the Monroe court's choice of section 43550 as a
proper remedy is open to question. The section cannot fairly be said
to be drawn with narrow specificity. It is by its very nature flexible
and designed to cover a broad spectrum of reinstatement problems.
Its application as a remedy to a free speech claim may be inadequate.
Testing the Remedy
On the one hand, the Monroe court recognized the delicacy of the
remedy question in a free speech context by applying the standards nor-
mally governing statutes which affect First Amendment rights.45 First,
the court observed that continued exclusion would be continued pun-
ishment for the exercise of First Amendment rights by stigmatizing
Monroe and preventing him from pursuing his chosen profession.
46
Second, the court found that the exclusion could have a "chilling ef-
fect" on sensitive First Amendment rights which hold a position of
special importance in schools and colleges.4 7  Finally, the court ob-
served that the academic community would be enriched and broadened
by the presence of individuals "with conscientiously held beliefs and
ideals," thereby avoiding an undesirable "pall of orthodoxy."48
On the other hand, despite this recognition that a failure to rein-
state Monroe could have a chilling effect on First Amendment rights,
the Monroe court proceeded to qualify his remedy in a manner which
appears inconsistent with principles enunciated in Vogel. The Vogel
case had stated that "the utility of imposing the conditions must mani-
festly outweigh the impairment of constitutional rights."49 Yet, in ap-
plying section 43550 the Monroe court detailed two conditions to Mon-
40. CA.L. ADM. CODE §§ 43006, 43407, 43408.
41. Id. § 43000-08.
42. Id. H§ 43400-10.
43. Id. H8 43550, 43551.
44. See Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 5, Monroe v. Trustees of the Cal.
State Colleges, 6 CaL 3d 399, 491 P.2d 1105, 99 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1971).
45. See 6 Cal. 3d at 411-12, 491 P.2d at 1113, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
46. Id. at 411, 491 P.2d at 1113, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 412, 491 P.2d at 1113, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
49. 68 Cal. 2d at 21, 434 P.2d at 963, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 411. See text accompany-
ing notes 32 & 33 supra.
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roe's reinstatement. 50 First, the trustees were free to inquire into his
present fitness, apart from grounds for prior termination, and reorder
a dismissal if, after notice and hearing, justifiable grounds existed for
discharge from the tenured position.51 Second, the court discussed the
administrative problems which would occur if, for example, someone
else occupied the position to which the discharged employee would other-
wise be entitled. The Monroe court concluded that "practical consid-
erations will certainly justify a reasonable accommodation of the various
interests at stake, and the reinstated employee can properly be of-
fered a reasonable alternative position.
'52
Inquiry Into Present Fitness
When the first condition imposed upon Monroe's reinstatement is
tested against the standards of Vogel, the balancing of interests appears
justified. The utility of permitting the trustees' inquiry into Monroe's
present fitness clearly outweighs the possible impairment of his con-
stitutional rights. 3 A state certainly has a vital interest in maintain-
ing the quality of its educational system. When a teacher, such as Mon-
roe, has been absent from the profession this objective can be fully at-
tained by testing the discharged instructor to determine his continued
proficiency.54 Therefore, the first qualification to Monroe's reinstate-
ment5 5 is consistent with the Vogel requirement of a legitimate and
substantial governmental purpose which achieves a narrow end and
does not broadly stifle personal liberties. 6
A Reasonable Accommodation of Interests
By contrast, the second condition imposed on Monroe's remedy
does not appear to meet the tests of Vogel, which admonished that
precision of regulation is required so that the exercise of our freedoms
will not be curtailed. It follows that a remedy fashioned for a free
speech claimant must also be precise. The Monroe court's conclusion
that practical considerations would justify a reasonable accommoda-
tion of interests does not seem to meet this standard of precision.
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the Monroe court's concern
for the avoidance of administrative problems with the concern for im-
50. See 6 Cal. 3d at 412-13, 491 P.2d at 1114, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
51. Id. at 412, 491 P.2d at 1114, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
52. Id. at 412-13, 491 P.2d at 1114, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
53. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
54. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960); Lerner v. Los Angeles
City Bd. of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 382, 400, 380 P.2d 97, 107, 29 Cal. Rptr. 657, 667
(1963); Wilson v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 61, 65, 351 P.2d 761, 765, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 489, 493 (1960).
55. 6 Cal. 3d at 412, 491 P.2d at 1113, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
56. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
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pairment of fundamental First Amendment rights expresed in Vogel
5
7
and other First Amendment cases. 58 Considering the vigorous con-
cern for Monroe's First Amendment rights expressed earlier in the opin-
ion, this apparent retreat is surprising. Once the compelling state in-
terest in the quality of the profession is satisfied by testing present fit-
ness, the appropriate remedy should be unequivocal reinstatement to
the status and salary to which the discharged employee would have been
entitled had he not been discharged. 9 Anything less than full rein-
statement would undermine the court's stated objective of avoiding a
continued "stigma" on Monroe, and a "chilling effect' and "pall of
orthodoxy" on the profession.6 ° A reasonable accommodation of in-
terests might result in a reduction of salary or status. As a practical
matter, this would constitute a continuing punishment of Monroe for
exercising his First Amendment rights and thereby deter other public
employees from expressing unpopular views. This result is hardly con-
sistent with protections of First Amendment rights mandated by Vogel.
What Is a Reasonable Alternative Position?
In concluding that Monroe could be offered a reasonable alterna-
tive position, the California Supreme Court undermined what might
otherwise have proved an acceptable remedy for a free speech claim.
Section 43550 itself provides for a teacher's reinstatement "to a position
in the classification which he left or the equivalent thereof."'61 Had the
California Supreme Court construed the section strictly, the remedy
would have been adequate for a claim arising under the First Amend-
ment. A strict construction of section 43550 would permit no reduc-
tion in status or salary since this would not be "equivalent" to the posi-
tion left. However, the Monroe opinion's "reasonable alternative" lan-
guage0 2 and an additional footnote reference63 to nonconstitutional re-
instatement cases 4 cast doubt on the question of whether section 43550
57. Id.
58. Compare 6 Cal. 3d at 412-13, 491 P.2d at 1114, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138 with
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957) (dictum): "We do not now
conceive of any circumstance wherein a state interest would justify infringement of
rights in [academic freedom and political expression] fields."
59. Cf. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 24212 (West 1969). See text accompanying notes
94-96 infra. It also should be kept in mind that the statute of limitations would still
preclude most of Monroe's monetary recovery. 6 Cal. 3d at 414, 491 P.2d at 1115, 99
Cal. Rptr. at 139.
60. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supfa.
61. 6 Cal. 3d at 413, 491 P.2d at 1114, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138; CAL. ADMWN. CODE
tit. 5 § 43550 quoted at note 8 supra.
62. 6 Cal. 3d at 412-13, 491 P.2d at 1114, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
63. Id. at n.8.
64. Mass v. Board of Educ., 61 Cal. 2d 612, 394 P.2d 579, 39 Cal. Rptr. 739
(1964) (reinstatement seven years after dismissal); DiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ.,
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has been strictly construed in this First Amendment context. Rather,
the section appears to have been interpreted as applicable in the same
manner as in other tenure and reinstatement cases such as Lerner.
6 5
If Administrative Code section 43550 is loosely applied in de-
fining the scope of the remedy for a tenured teacher wrongfully dis-
charged for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the problem of
status or salary reduction is hardly illusory. Salary is a well-litigated
aspect of tenure. Kacsur v. Board of Trustees6 emphasized that al-
though tenure adds some legal consequences to the primarily contrac-
tual relationship between the teacher and the employer, a teacher has
no vested right to a particular salary.67 The tenured teacher has pro-
tection in that "the fixing of salaries must not be discriminatory, arbi-
trary or unreasonable."6  Later cases have upheld the discretionary
power of school boards to raise and lower salaries subject to the stand-
ards of review announced in Kacsur.6 9
A 1970 California appellate court case, Gilbaugh v. Bautzer,7 in-
volved a salary reduction authorized under California Education Code
section 22607. 1' Gilbaugh was transferred from his $21,960 per year
administrative position to a $16,212 per year teaching position. Sec-
tion 22607 specifically authorizes the reassignment of an administrative
employee to an academic position "commensurate with his qualifications
at the salary fixed for that position . .. Gilbaugh argued that
the new position was not commensurate with his qualifications. The
court allowed the transfer since he was also qualified for the lower pay-
ing position and cited Kacsur as authority for allowing the salary re-
duction.
73
The Monroe case is clearly distinguishable since Monroe was not
an administrative employee"4 subject to such a transfer. However, be-
cause of Gilbaugh, precedent exists for a large salary reduction under
57 Cal. 2d 167, 367 P-2d 865, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1962) (reinstatement nine years af-
ter dismissal).
65. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
66. 18 Cal. 2d 586, 116 P.2d 593 (1941).
67. Id. at 591, 116 P.2d at 596.
68. Id. at 592, 116 P.2d at 596; accord, Rible v. Hughes, 24 Cal. 2d 437, 443-45,
150 P.2d 455, 458 (1944).
69. E.g., Brown v. Hanford Elem. School Bd., 263 Cal. App. 2d 170, 172-74,
69 Cal. Rptr. 154, 156-58 (1968) (statutory authority to fix salaries authorizes both
raises and reductions); San Diego Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 216 Cal.
App. 2d 758, 762, 31 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (1963).
70. 3 Cal. App. 3d 793, 83 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1970).
71. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22607 (West 1969).
72. Id.
73. 3 Cal. App. 3d at 796-97, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
74. See CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 5, § 42700(m).
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one of the three statutes authorizing section 43550.75 Thus, the appli-
cation of Gilbaugh and other salary adjustment cases76 to the "reason-
able accommodation of the various interests at stake"77 in Monroe is
an open question. That Monroe's free speech remedy should be sub-
ject to such imprecise guidelines is within neither the spirit nor the letter
of the Vogel opinion.
An Alternative Remedy
As already discussed, section 43550 is by nature flexible and de-
signed to cover a broad variety of reinstatement problems. 78 Had the
section been strictly construed, Monroe's remedy might have withstood
the tests of Vogel. Yet a strict construction of the section would be
inconsistent with its application to a non-free speech claim where a rea-
sonable accommodation of interests may be justified. The suggestion
that 43550 be strictly construed in a free speech context places the court
in the awkward position of reading the section one way for one purpose
and a different way for another. Because of this difficulty, it is im-
portant to explore alternative remedies which may be available to the
court should it be faced with a similar claim in the future.
Tenure Rights Distinguished from Free Speech Rights
Before the nature of an available alternative remedy can be de-
scribed, it must be understood that the rights of tenure are distinct
from those rights which accrue when a teacher is discharged solely on
the basis of a valid exercise of First Amendment rights. Two teacher
reinstatement cases decided by the United States Supreme Court shortly
after Monroe illustrate this point. Perry v. Sindermann7' held that a
teacher who proved that he had attained de facto tenure was entitled
to a hearing at which he could assert a free speech defense to his fir-
ing.80 Board of Regents v. Roth81 held that a teacher was not entitled
to such a hearing upon nonrenewal of his first one year contract simply
because his defense was also based on free speech.82 Nonetheless, both
cases recognized and reaffirmed the principle that free speech rights
are independent of rights of tenure:
[Mack of a contractual or tenure 'right' to re-employment for the
1969-1970 academic year is immaterial to [the petitioner's] free
75. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 22604, 22607, 24201 (West 1969). See note 8 supra.
76. See notes 66 & 69 and accompanying text supra.
77. 6 Cal. 3d at 412, 491 P.2d at 1114, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
78. See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
79. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
80. Id. at 602-03.
81. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
82. Id. at 568-69.
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speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held
that the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school teacher's one year
contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights.83
Of course, Monroe was tenured and entitled to a hearing and pro-
tection under section 43550 and applicable tenure rules.8 4 Yet, Perry
and Roth suggest a right to re-employment in this First Amendment
context that is independent of section 43550 and its general guidelines.
Thus, since Monroe was discharged solely for his refusal to sign an
unconstitutional oath, it appears that he would have been entitled to
reinstatement even had he not been tenured. Therefore, the trustees'
duty to reinstate Monroe arose independently of tenured status and of
section 43550. The duty is one imposed by the Constitution: nonin-
terference with the valid exercise of a free speech right. 5
Reinstatement on Mandamus
Once it is established that the trustees' duty to reinstate a free
speech claimant arises independently of the duty to reinstate a tenured
teacher, the scope of the remedy available to the California court be-
comes clear. The nature of mandamus,86 a procedure properly fol-
lowed by Monroe to establish his right of reinstatement to public em-
ployment,87 suggests no limitation on the power of the court to provide
more specific guidelines than those set out in section 43550. Manda-
mus may properly compel the trustees to perform a law imposed, non-
discretionary or ministerial duty toward a person establishing a right
to performance of that duty. 8 The duty to reinstate a person so enti-
tled may normally be discretionary to some extent in its execution, but
the discretion of administrative bodies is subject to the court's control
when First Amendment rights are involved.89 Thus the court would
83. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98; accord, Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14.
84. See 6 Cal. 3d at 410, 491 P.2d at 1112, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
85. Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 562, 421 P.2d 697, 698, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 506 (1967) (mandamus to compel reinstatement of provisional county em-
ployee). "The ultimate boundaries of plaintiff's rights are set not by the rules of the
Alameda County Civil Service Commission but by the Constitution of the United States."
Id.
86. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1084-97 (West 1955) as amended (Supp. 1972).
87. Id. § 1085 provides in part: "[Mandamus] may be issued . . . to compel
the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled, and from which he is unlawfully precluded .... ." See Thornton v. Board
of Trustees, 262 Cal. App. 2d 761, 763, 68 Cal. Rptr. 842, 843-44 (1968); Titus v.
Lawndale School Dist., 157 Cal. App. 2d 822, 830, 322 P.2d 56, 61 (1958).
88. See E. FRANK, CALIFORNIA CIVIL WRITS § 5.7 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1970);
5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 3838 (2d ed. 1971).
89. See Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Board of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 557,
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not be ordering the trustees to do more than the law commands. 90
Rather, the court would be defining the applicable law in this special
situation.
Had the Monroe court wished to provide its own detailed reinstate-
ment order, mandamus requirements would have been fulfilled without
reference to section 43550 or to California Education Code section
2420191 which provides a statutory reinstatement duty on the part of
the trustees.92 Monroe's right to reinstatement is not merely statu-
tory nor is it predicated solely upon section 43550 or tenured status.
Since the Constitution of the United States also defines that right,
93
it was within the power of the California court to fashion a mandamus
remedy which would meet the precise requirements of Vogel. Had the
California court exercised this power, the problems of possible reduc-
tion in status or salary which follow from the application of section
43550 might have been avoided. A carefully drafted mandamus
would have made the court a more effective guardian of free speech.
Had the court not relied on section 43550, the drafting of rein-
statement guidelines would not have been difficult. An example of
the specificity with which the mandamus might have been drafted is pro-
vided by California Education Code section 2421294 which covers re-
instatement following an employee's military or Red Cross service dur-
ing a national emergency or "any war" in which the United States is en-
gaged. This section is very explicit in requiring reinstatement "to the
position held by him at the time of his entrance into such military serv-
ice, at the salary to which he would have been entitled had he not ab-
sented himself from his duties."9 This is the type of "narrow specific-
ity" advocated in Vogel9 and available to the Monroe court as an ex-
ample of the precise regulation so often demanded in the First Amend-
ment context.
Conclusion
Monroe properly relied on Lerner to conclude that the statute of
limitations eliminated any pre-1968 remedy related to the initial dis-
455 P.2d 827, 831, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 727 (1969); Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d
559, 563, 421 P.2d 697, 699, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505, 507 (1967).
90. CAL. CODE CIrv. PROC. § 1094.5(e) (West 1955) provides in part: "[The
court] may order respondent to take such further action as is specially enjoined upon
it by law but the judgment shall not limit or control in any way the discretion legally
vested in the respondent." See generally Wood v. Strother, 76 Cal. 545, 548-54, 18
P. 766, 768-71 (1888).
91. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 24201 (West 1969) quoted at note 38 supra.
92. See id.
93. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
94. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 24212 (West 1969).
95. Id.
96. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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charge, and that new rights accrued upon the improper summary re-
fusal by the trustees to reinstate Monroe in 1968. Monroe goes beyond
Lerner as the first California Supreme Court case to discuss teacher rein-
statement in detail and to prescribe Administrative Code section 43550
as a remedy. Recognizing that the actual remedy provided is the real
measure of relief granted, the court discussed the remedy in some de-
tail. 7  The Monroe court properly based the prescription of section
43550 on First Amendment considerations' s as distinct from consid-
erations of tenure.
However, while the court did not base the remedy of section
43550 on the principles of tenure, the opinion may be susceptible to
that interpretation due to a lack of clarity in that part of the opinion.
Section 43550 was applied as a remedy at the end of a long discussion
dealing primarily with tenure. 9  This area of the opinion is a source
of potential confusion because it does not adequately distinguish the
issue of tenure from the free speech issue. In view of these references
to tenure""° and the "reasonable accommodation" language, 101 the rem-
edy of section 43550 could be interpreted in the context of tenure rather
than free speech.
If the distinction between tenure rights and free speech rights is
observed and section 43550 is strictly construed as a remedy in a First
Amendment context, the court's desired "ultimate vindication of the re-
doubtable right of free expression"'01 2 will be possible. If, however,
the discussion of tenure rights immediately preceding the prescription
of section 43550 and the later qualifications concerning present fitness
and reasonable alternative positions imply that Monroe is to be rein-
stated according to tenure principles, the court's desired result is less
likely to be achieved. Such an interpretation would allow considerably
more flexibility than a First Amendment construction of section 43550,
as illustrated by the salary adjustment cases. This could lead to an un-
desirable chilling of freedom of expression.
Because of this possibility, it is hoped that the opinion will be in-
terpreted to add the stated First Amendment principles to the imple-
mentation of section 43550 in this special situation, and that "reasonable
alternatives" do not imply that any reduction of status or salary is au-
thorized. This latter interpretation seems proper and consistent with
the development of the law in this area. Thus, administrators and lower
97. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
98. 6 Cal. 3d at 410-11, 491 P.2d at 1112-13, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 410 & 412, 491 P.2d at 1112 & 1114,99 Cal. Rptr. at 136 & 138.
101. Id. at 412-13, 491 P.2d at 1114, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
102. See id. at 414, 491 P.2d at 1115, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
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courts should apply section 43550 in the spirit of the First Amendment
principles expressed by the court.
Should the California court again be faced with the problem of
fashioning a remedy for a teacher discharged because of an exercise
of free speech rights, a different approach should be taken. The court
should exercise the mandamus power to prescribe reinstatement within
narrow boundaries. A carefully drafted mandamus would avoid con-
ferring too much administrative discretion on the reinstating body and
would more adequately protect the freedom of expression.
Robert E. Bergin, Jr.*
* Member, Second Year Class

